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CASES NOTED
RECOVERY FOR MENTAL ANGUISH CAUSED BY
MALICIOUS DESTRUCTION OF PET DOG
The plaintiff, a customer of the defendant corporation, brought an
action for the wilful and malicious killing of her pet dog by the defend-
ant's employee, a garbage collector. The plaintiff witnessed the employee
throw a garbage can in the direction of the dog and heard her dog yelp.
Upon discovering that her dog had expired from the blow, the plaintiff
suffered great mental anguish. The trial court granted recovery of 2,000
dollars compensatory damages and 1,000 dollars punitive damages, and
the defendant appealed on the ground that the trial court erred in charging
the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the alleged mental
suffering. The second district court of appeals reversed the judgment and
remanded the cause for a new trial on the issue of damages.' On certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Florida, held, judgment of the district court of
appeals quashed, with directions to order the judgment of the trial court
reinstated: an owner's mental anguish resulting from the malicious de-
struction of her dog was a proper element for the jury to consider in
assessing damages. La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc., 163 So.2d
267 (Fla. 1964).
Since the early case of I de S et ux v. W de S, Y. B.2 the courts have
recognized the existence of a cause of action for emotional distress'
unaccompanied by physical impact or contemporaneous physical harm.
Notwithstanding their early recognition of a cause of action, the courts
have been hesitant in allowing recovery because of the fear of false
claims4 and the difficulty in assessing damages.5 The language used in
Bosley v. Andrews6 exemplifies this attitude of judicial caution:
1. Associated Independents, Inc. v. La Porte, 158 So.2d 557 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
2. 22 Edw. 3, f. 99, p1. 60 (1348).
3. See REsTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 46, comment j at 26 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1957):
Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, mental
anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant
mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment,
anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry and nausea.
4. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg,
212 Pa. 548, 61 Atl. 1022 (1905).
5. Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.C. 577, 598, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861): "Mental pain
or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act
complained of causes that alone. . . ." E.g., Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Gelvin, 238 Fed. 14
(8th Cir. 1916); Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916);
Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900).
Some courts have also expressed the view that difficulty of proof and administrative
problems should not provide valid obstacles to rendering justice. See State Rubbish Collectors
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To allow recovery for fright, fear, nervous shock, humiliation,
mental or emotional distress-with all the disturbances and ill-
nesses which accompany or result therefrom-where there has
been no physical injury or impact, would open a Pandora's box.7
Historically, the courts have looked to the defendant's conduct to
determine whether the plaintiff's mental suffering was a foreseeable result
of the wrongful act. In extending liability the courts have distinguished
between intentional and negligent acts.' When the defendant's conduct
was merely negligent with respect to the plaintiff, recovery for mental
anguish generally has been deniedY However, when as the result of the
defendant's negligence a plaintiff sustains bodily injuries 10 or impact,'
even though minor in character," then mental suffering has been held a
legitimate element of damages.
Courts have also permitted recovery in other exceptional instances.
One such instance is the negligent mishandling of corpses.'8 In addition,
a minority of states have allowed redress for the negligent transmission
of telegraph messages. 14 In these cases, the defendant's conduct has been
Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 App. Div. 2d
16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958). But see Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp.,
49 A.2d 81 (D.C. Ct. App. 1946).
6. 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
7. Id. at 168, 142 A.2d at 266 (Emphasis added.).
8. See Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA.
L. REv. 586 (1933).
9. Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612 (1916); Parmelee v. Ackerman, 252
F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1958); Crane v. Loftin, 70 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1954); Kuhr Bros., Inc. v.
Spahos, 89 Ga. App. 885, 81 S.E.2d 491 (1954); Sullivan v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc.,
341 Mass. 214, 168 N.E.2d 80 (1960); Van Hoy v. Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
205 Okla. 1135, 235 P.2d 948 (1951) ; Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958) ;
Sanford v. Ware, 191 Va. 43, 60 S.E.2d 10 (1950). But see Brown v. Broome County, 10
App. Div. 2d 152, 197 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1960); Lanford v. West Oakwood Cemetery Addition,
Inc., 233 S.C. 350, 75 S.E.2d 865 (1953).
In Florida, liability has been imposed by statute in two instances for negligently-caused
mental anguish: FLA. STAT. § 768.03 (1963) (mental suffering of parents because of wrongful
death of child); FLA. STAT. § 363.06 (1963) (telegraph companies liable for negligent
delivery).
10. Weston v. National Mfrs. & Stores Corp., 253 Ala. 503, 45 So.2d 459 (1950) ; Lindley
v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440 (1918); Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714,
156 A.2d 149 (1959); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Stewart v.
Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957); Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d
345 (1957).
11. Crane v. Loftin, 70 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1954); Kramer v. Ricksmeier, 159 Iowa 48,
139 N.W. 1091 (1913) ; Greenberg v. Stanley, 51 N.J. Super. 90, 143 A.2d 588 (1958).
12. In Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961), a jolt from an
automobile was found to be a sufficient impact to permit compensation for the resulting
neurosis.
For a complete discussion of the states adhering to the "impact" or "injury" require-
ments, see Note, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 540 (1964).
13. Clemm v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 126 Kan. 181, 268 Pac. 103 (1928); Blanchard
v. Brawley, 75 So.2d 891 (La. App. 1954); Klumbach v. Silver Mount Cemetery Ass'n, 242
App. Div. 843, 275 N.Y. Supp. 180 (1934).
14. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743 (1930); Mentzer v.
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considered very likely to produce genuine mental anguish.' 5 Moreover,
when the conduct is reckless,' 6 the courts, fortified by the Restatement,7
have permitted compensation for emotional distress."8
In cases in which an actor has negligently harmed or placed one
person in peril, and a third person sustains mental disturbance as a result
of his fear for the other's safety, the courts have been reluctant to extend
compensation to the injured party.' In a recent case, Amaya v. Home
Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.,2" the court denied recovery when faced with an
action brought by a mother for the fright and shock which she suffered
as a result of watching her seventeen month-old child being killed by a
negligent motorist. In denying compensation to the third party, the court
pointed to the absence of any duty owing to the particular plaintiff. In
the few cases in which the third person has been allowed to recover, the
wrongful act was either intentional or reckless 2' in nature. Exemplary of
Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62 N.W. 1 (1895); Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943) ; So Relle v. Western Union Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308 (1881).
See note 9, supra, wherein Florida has imposed statutory liability upon telegraph
companies for the negligent delivery of telegraph messages.
15. Since the circumstances surrounding "dead body" cases and "telegraph" cases
usually involve relatives who are in a mental condition conducive to great emotional dis-
tress, the courts have relaxed their usual objections.
16. For a definition of the term "reckless," as contrasted to mere "negligence," see
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 500, comment g at 1296, (1934).
17. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS, § 46 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957).
18. E.g., Boyle v. Chandler, 33 Del. 323, 138 Atl. 273 (1927) (switching of caskets
without plaintiff's consent); Blakeley v. Shortal's Estate, 236 Iowa 787, 20 N.W.2d 28
(1945) (deceased committed suicide in neighbor's home) ; Lindh v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
99 Minn. 408, 109 N.W. 823 (1906) (carrier left casket exposed to elements); Price v.
Yellow Pine Paper Mill Co., 240 S.W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (employer's servant
exposed mutilated husband to wife).
19. E.g., Preece v. Baur, 143 F. Supp. 804 (D. Idaho 1956) (parents watched house
burn with children inside); Angst v. Great Northern Ry., 131 F. Supp. 156 (D. Minn.
1955) (employee's fear of injury to fellow worker in collision) ; Lessard v. Tarca, 20 Conn.
Supp. 295, 133 A.2d 625 (Super. Ct. 1957) (parents watched child burn to death in auto
accident); Vinet v. Checker Cab Co., 140 So.2d 252 (La. App. 1962) (father's mental
anguish upon seeing daughter's injuries); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879
(1952) (mother watched daughter struck by automobile) ; Berg v. Baum, 224 N.Y.S.2d 974
(Sup. Ct. 1962) (automobile struck child in parents' presence) ; All v. John Gerber Co., 36
Tenn. App. 134, 252 S.W.2d 138 (1952) (husband's mental anguish at seeing wife's injuries);
Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) (mother watched child killed
by automobile). See generally, Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 220 (1951). But cf. Pennick v. Mirro,
189 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Va. 1960) (plaintiff feared for her own safety).
20. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513 (1963).
21. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 46(2) at 22 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957) states:
Where such conduct is directed at a third person the actor is subject to liability
if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another who is
present at the time. (Emphasis added.)
With the requisite intentional or reckless conduct, the actor is presumed to know that
his acts will, or at least are highly likely to cause severe emotional distress to the plaintiff.
The cases generally have limited liability to instances in which the act is committed within
the plaintiff's presence, consistent with the Restatement position. E.g., Rogers v. Willard, 144
Ark. 587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920) (threat with gun in presence of plaintiff) ; Jeppsen v. Jensen,
47 Utah 536, 155 Pac. 429 (1916) (threat to kill husband with gun in plaintiff's presence);
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these cases is Hill v. Kimball,22 in which the defendant assaulted two
other persons in the presence of a husband and wife. As a result of the
shock caused by witnessing the assault, the plaintiff-wife suffered a mis-
carriage. The court held that the physical injuries resulting from the
shock were proximately caused by the defendant's negligent conduct
toward the plaintiff, notwithstanding the fact that the assault upon the
others was intentional.
There is a natural tendency of the courts to grant more readily a
remedy for an intentional tort. In compensating for mental suffering it
is apparent that the courts have adhered to this principle. Justice Snow
best expressed the reasons that the judiciary has imposed liability when
the conduct may be distinguished by degree of fault:
In determining how far the law will trace causation and afford a
remedy, the facts as to the defendant's intent, his imputable
knowledge, or his justifiable ignorance are often taken into ac-
count. The moral element is here the factor that has turned
close cases one way or the other. . . . [It] is not because the
defendant's act was a more immediate cause in one case than in
others, but because it has been felt to be just and reasonable
that liability should extend to results further removed when
certain elements of fault were present.2"
Therefore, when the defendant's conduct has amounted to a wan-
ton and willful wrong, the traditional objections to the extension of lia-
bility for emotional suffering have been overcome. Consonant with this
theory, recovery has been allowed when:
(1) the mental anguish could be classified as "parasitic" 4 upon a
cause of action for the intentional violation of some other recognized
legal right ;25
Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924) (battery on plaintiff's father,
seen from window).
22. 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
23. Derosier v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 N.H. 451, 463, 130 Ad. 145, 152 (1925).
24. The term "parasitic" was used originally in 1 STREEr, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL
LIABILITY 470 (1906):
The treatment of any element of damage as a parasitic factor belongs essentially
to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A factor which is to-day recognized as
parasitic will, forsooth, to-morrow be recognized as an independent basis of liability.
25. The independent causes of action, which time and time again have been recognized
as sufficient to allow recovery for mental anguish when accompanied by the requisite
maliciousness, wilfulness and wantonness are:
1. Assault: Atlanta Hub Co. v. Jones, 47 Ga. 778, 171 S.E. 470 (1933); Kline v.
Kline, 158 Ind. 602, 605, 64 N.E. 9, 10 (1902): "There was a touching of the mind, if not
of the body."; Holdorf v. Holdorf, 185 Iowa 838, 169 N.W. 737 (1918) ; Trogden v. Terry,
172 N.C. 540, 90 S.E. 583 (1916) ; Allen v. Hannaford, 138 Wash. 423, 244 Pac. 700 (1926).
2. False Imprisonment: Gadsen General Hosp. v. Hamilton, 212 Ala. 531, 103
So. 553 (1925); Jacques v. Child Dining Hall Co., 244 Mass. 438, 138 N.E. 843 (1923);
Fisher v. Rumler, 239 Mich. 224, 214 N.W. 310 (1927) ; Talcott v. National Exhibition Co.,




(2) the courts recognize an independent cause of action for inten-
tional interference with peace of mind; 26 and
(3) there are punitive damages, enabling the jury to take into ac-
count the mental suffering experienced by the plaintiff. 7
3. Seduction; Anthony v. Norton, 60 Kan. 341, 56 Pac. 529 (1899); Haeissig v.
Decker, 139 Minn. 422, 166 N.W. 1085 (1918).
4. Malicious Prosecution: Black v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 218 Fed. 239 (D.C.N.Y. 1914);
Wheeler v. Hanson, 161 Mass. 370, 37 N.E. 382 (1894); Price v. Minnesota, D. & W. Ry.,
130 Minn. 229, 153 N.W. 532 (1915).
5. Trespass to Land: Dawsey v. Newton, 244 Ala. 661, 15 So.2d 271 (1943)
Lyons v. Smith, 176 Ark. 728, 3 S.W.2d 982 (1928); Valley Dev. Co. v. Weeks, 147
Colo. 591, 364 P.2d 730 (1961) (dictum); Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1068
(1902); Oglesby v. Town of Winnfield, 27 So.2d 137 (La. App. 1946); Ford v. Schliess-
man, 107 Wis. 479, 83 N.W. 761 (1900).
6. Trespass to Chattels: Bryson v. Phelps, 23 Ala. App. 346, 125 So. 795 (1930);
Klein v. St. Louis Transit Co., 117 Mo. App. 691, 93 S.W. 281 (1906); M. J. Rose Co. v.
Lowery, 33 Ohio App. 488, 169 N.E. 716 (1929) ; McCallister v. Sappingfield, 72 Ore. 422,
144 Pac. 432 (1914); Vogel v. McAuliffe, 18 R.I. 791, 31 AUt. 1 (1895); McClure v. Camp-
bell, 42 Wash. 252, 84 Pac. 825 (1906).
7. Invasion of Right of Privacy: Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So.2d 118 (1948);
Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931); Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198,
20 So.2d 243 (1944); Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Co., 247 Iowa 817, 76 N.W.2d 762
(1956) ; Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) ; Flake v. Greensboro News Co.,
212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); Langford v. Vanderbilt Univ., 199 Tenn. 389, 287
S.W.2d 32 (1956).
For a complete discussion of the jurisdictions which recognize recovery for mental
anguish because of the invasion of the legally protected interest in privacy, see Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 386 (1960).
26. Cohen v. Lion Products Co., 177 F. Supp. 486, 489 (D. Mass. 1959):
Thus while the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress bears some anology
to the ancient tort of assault, an essential difference is that in an assault action
plaintiff must prove as an element his apprehension of bodily contact.
E.g., Herman Saks & Son v. Ivey, 26 Ala. App. 240, 157 So. 265 (1934) (threatening
letter) ; Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954) (jokingly told wife that husband
was hospitalized); Wright v. Husband, 193 Ark. 347, 99 S.W.2d 583 (1936) (wrongful
attachment) ; State Rubbish Collectors Assoc. v. Siliznoff, supra note 6 (threat) ; Delta
Fin. Co. v. Ganakas, 93 Ga. App. 297, 91 S.E.2d 383 (1956) (threat to child); Barnett v.
Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932) (harassment by creditor);
Quina v. Robert's, 16 So.2d 558 (La. App. 1944) (debt collection); Johnson v. Sampson,
167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926) (accusation of misconduct); La Salle Extension Univ.
v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934) (threat of suit by letters for over two years) ;
Mitran v. Williamson, 21 Misc. 2d 106, 197 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1960) (sent plaintiff obscene pic-
tures of self); Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961) (solicitation over the phone to
have intercourse).
For a relatively up-to-date discussion of the conduct requisite for a cause of action for
intentional interference with peace of mind, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, § 46 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1957).
27. At least three jurisdictions specifically recognize punitive damages to compensate
for wounded feelings and injured dignity. Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746
(1922); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873); Williams v. Yoe, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 281, 46
S.W. 659 (1898). See Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 520-21
(1957); Punitive Damages, 46 VA. L. REV. 1036, 1039 (1960).
In Proehl, Anguish of Mind, 56 Nw. U. L. REv. 477, 501 (1961), the author directs
his attention to emphasizing that all "pain and suffering," including mental anguish, should
be recognized as punitive in nature. The author further states that: "To recognize this,
however, is not to deny that such damages may well serve a useful purpose."
For a discussion of the English view of considering mental anguish as compensable as
an element of exemplary damages, see MAYNE & Mc GREGOR, DAMAGES, § 212 (12th ed. 1961).
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When property is injured by the mere "wrongful" act of a defendant,
and because of such injury the owner sustains mental suffering, the courts
generally have limited the recoverable damages to the market value of
the property.28 On the other hand, in a small class of cases the courts
have been virtually unanimous in extending liability to damages for an
owner's mental distress when the destruction or wrongful possession of
personal property has been accompanied by wanton, malicious or con-
tumely conduct.29 Even though there was no element of personal danger
involved and the mental disturbance complained of arose solely from
the plaintiff's distress brought about by the injury to his property inter-
ests, the courts have found that the mental anguish was a proximate
result of the wrongful act.
Illustrative of the manner in which the courts limit liability when the
mental anguish or shock is caused by the defendant's negligence is Aron-
off v. Baltimore Transit Co. ° In that case, the defendant negligently ran
28. E.g., B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hughes, 239 Ala. 373, 194 So. 842 (1940) (trespass and
conversion of automobile); Valley Dev. Co. v. Weeks, 147 Colo. 591, 364 P.2d 730 (1961)
(destruction of vested ditch right); Owsley v. Fowler, infra note 30; Klein v. St. Louis
Transit Co., infra note 30; Murray v. Mace, 41 Neb. 60, 59 N.W. 387 (1894) (destruction
of household goods); Wilcox v. Butt's Drug Stores, Inc., infra note 30; Buchanan v. Stout,
123 App. Div. 648, 108 N.Y. Supp. 38 (1908) (defendant's dog mangled cat in owner's
presence) ; Phillips v. Cordes Towing Serv., 50 Wash. 2d 545, 313 P.2d 377 (1957) (towing
away of car); Anderson v. Sloane, 72 Wisc. 566, 40 N.W. 214 (1888) (wrongful seizure
of goods). See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 68 (1941).
29. In Sager v. Sisters of Mercy, 81 Colo. 498, 256 Pac. 8 (1927), there was a wrongful
taking and destruction of plaintiff's belongings. Here, malice in law was implied by de-
fendant's unwarranted conduct.
Recovery was allowed for the humiliation resulting from the destruction of merchandise
caused by a defect in a fire protection system in Davis v. Hall, 21 Ga. App. 265, 94 S.E.
274 (1917).
The court in Brown v. Zorn, 275 S.W. 572 (Mo. App. 1925) allowed compensation
for the mental distress resulting in physical injuries due to the defendant's malicious destruc-
tion of plaintiff's automobile.
In Vogel v. McAuliffe, 18 R.I. 791, 31 Ad. 1 (1895), damages for mental anguish were
held recoverable by a mother for her concern over her sick child as a consequence of the
destruction of her furnace.
The recent case of City of Garland v. White, 368 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963)
allowed recovery for the mental anguish caused by the intentional destruction of a dog by
a police officer. The officer shot the dog, trespassed on plaintiff's property and damaged
the house.
When there has been a wrongful seizure or repossession of personal property, compensa-
tion has been awarded due to the unjustified and malicious conduct accompanying the act.
E.g., Wright v. Husband, 193 Ark. 347, 99 S.W.2d 583 (1936) (wrongful seizure); Ohio
Fin. Co., v. Berry, 219 Ind. 94, 37 N.E.2d 2 (1941) (repossession),; M. J. Rose Co., v.
Lowery, 33 Ohio App. 488, 169 N.E. 716 (1929) (repossessed property while plaintiff was
away); Williams v. Yoe, supra note 27 (attorney deprived of law books). But see Stone v.
C.I.T. Corp., 122 Pa. Super. 71, 184 At. 674 (1936) (wrongful seizure of automobile must
be accompanied by physical injury).
See generally, Annot., 28 A.L.R. 1070 (1953).
30. 197 Md. 528, 80 A.2d 13 (1951). See also Owsley v. Fowler, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1154,
104 S.W. 762 (1907) (mishandling of furniture); State v. Baltimore Transit Co., 197
Md. 528, 80 A.2d 13 (1951) (automobile accident resulting in pedestrian's death from
mental shock); Renner v. Canfield, 36 Minn. 90, 30 N.W. 435 (1886) (intentional killing of
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its streetcar into a parked truck, loaded with plate glass, belonging to
the plaintiff's decedent. The glass shattered and as a result of the excite-
ment and confusion, the decedent who had viewed the accident, was
greatly shocked and frightened. Consequently, he sustained severe nerv-
ous upset, precipitating a heart attack from which he died. The court
held that the decedent's shock of witnessing the negligent injury to his
property was not a probable and natural consequence of the defendant's
act. This result is consistent with the denial of recovery for a mother's
emotional distress caused by her witnessing the negligently-caused death
of her child."'
The decision in the instant case clearly affirms earlier Florida deci-
sions permitting the recovery of damages for mental suffering when the
fault of the wrongdoer was great.3 2 The supreme court predicated its
decision on the holding of Kirksey v. Jernigan." In Kirksey, recovery
was allowed for the mental anguish suffered by the decedent's parents as
the result of the defendant's unauthorized embalming and refusal to
surrender their child's body until a fee for the embalming was paid. The
Kirksey case established that if the wrongful conduct was such as would
warrant the imposition of punitive damages, then mental anguish would
be recoverable as an element of damages. Following this test, the court
in the instant case found that the defendant's employee exhibited conduct
which was "malicious and demonstrated an extreme indifference to the
rights of the [plaintiff]." '' The court further declared that "[T]he re-
striction of the loss of a pet to its intrinsic value in circumstances such
as the ones before us is a principle we cannot accept. '35 In discussing
dog resulting in mental anguish to observer) ; Klein v. St. Louis Transit Co., 117 Mo. App.
691, 93 S.W. 281 (1906) (negligently ran over dog); Wilcox v. Butt's Drug Stores, Inc.,
28 N.M. 502, 35 P.2d 978 (1934) (dispensing of wrong drug resulting in dog's death);
Henry v. Southern Ry. Co., 93 S.C. 125, 75 S.E. 1018 (1912) (refuse put into stream
killed cattle). But see Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N.W. 890 (1938) (selling
poisonous cattle feed resulting in owner's shock and death).
31. See Atnaya, supra note 20.
32. Recovery for mental anguish was allowed in Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188,
189 (Fla. 1950), wherein the court set the requisite standard of conduct necessary to impose
liability on the defendant as:
[Wihere the wrongful act is such as . . . reasonably [to] imply malice . . . [or
when from] great indifference to the persons, property, or rights of others, such
malice will be imputed as would justify the assessment of exemplary or punitive
damages.
The Florida Supreme Court, in Crane v. Loftin, 70 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1954), held that
mental anguish could not be compensated when it was the result of mere negligence. In
Crane, the court stated that operating a train in a busy intersection at an excessive
rate of speed, causing the plaintiff to fear for her life and abandon her car, did not meet
the test of wanton conduct so as to impose liability for mental anguish without physical
impact.
33. Supra note 32.
34. La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc., 163 So.2d 267, 268 (Fla. 1964).
35. Id. at 269. The court was referring to the general rule in an action seeking damages
for the injury or destruction of a dog-i.e., that the basis of recovery may be either the
market value, if determinable, or some special or pecuniary value to the owner, ascertainable
by reference to the usefulness of the dog to its owner. See Klein v. St. Louis Transit Co.,
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the interest of the plaintiff which had been invaded by the defendant's
tortious act, the court explained: "[W]e feel that the affection of a
master for his dog is a very real thing and provides an element of damage
for which the owner should recover ... "30
In the instant case, the court was very cautious in its approach and
failed to pinpoint the theory of liability it had applied. The court could
have justified its decision either on the theory of "malicious trespass to
personal property" resulting in mental damage to the owner, or of an
"intentional interference with peace of mind." From the language of the
court, it seems evident that it was concerned with the affectionate rela-
tionship between a person and his dog.
In the aftermath of the court's decision, a crucial question still re-
mains unanswered: Will the Florida courts now permit recovery for
similar conduct directed at inanimate property or at a person, when no
property is involved and mental anguish results? The fact that the court
placed great emphasis on the effect of the defendant's conduct on the
plaintiff's mental security lends great weight to the proposition that
Florida has silently adopted the intentional interference with peace of
mind theory as a basis for the recovery of damages for mental suffering
without injury or physical impact.
BARRY KUTUN
PROCEDURE-RENDITION OF JUDGMENT
A decree was entered against the defendant and four days later
he filed, an appeal. An additional four days elapsed and the plaintiff
petitioned for a rehearing. The trial court granted the rehearing and
subsequently modified the decree. The plaintiff then moved the district
court of appeal to dismiss the appeal on the: basis that the appeal had
been taken from a final decree which had not been rendered and it was
therefore not a final decree for the purpose of appeal.' This motion was
denied. The plaintiff then petitioned the supreme court for a writ of
prohibition directing the district court to cease from further entertain-
supra note 30; Smith v. Palace Transp. Co., 142 Misc. 93, 253 N.Y. Supp. 87 (1931);
Young's Bus Lines, Inc. v. Redmon, 43 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Annot., 94
A.LR. 729 (1935); 3 C.J.S. Animals § 234 (1936).
36. Supra note 34, at 269.
1. FLA. App. R. 1.3. The last paragraph speaks on the question of rendition of judgments:
Rendition of a judgment, decision, order or decree means that it has been reduced
to writing, signed and made a matter of record, or if recording is not required then
filed. A paper is deemed to be recorded when filed with the clerk and assigned a
book and page number. Where there has been a timely and proper motion or petition
for a new trial, rehearing or reconsideration by the lower court, the decision, judg-
ment, order or decree shall not be deemed rendered until such motion or petition is
disposed of. (Emphasis added.)
[VOL. XIX
